CEO薪酬、分析师关注与企业社会责任

(西北大学 经济管理学院,陕西 西安 710127)

CEO薪酬; 薪酬激励; 分析师关注; 企业社会责任

CEO Compensation, Analyst Following and Corporate Social Responsibility
GUO Jing

(School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi'an 710127, China)

CEO compensation; compensation incentives; analyst following; corporate social responsibility

DOI: 10.15986/j.1008-7192.2019.06.009

备注

为了验证企业社会责任的内外部影响机制,以2010—2017年我国A股上市公司为样本,以CEO薪酬激励及分析师“监督”假说为基础,对CEO薪酬、分析师关注对企业社会责任的影响进行了实证研究。研究发现CEO薪酬越高,企业的社会责任承担水平越高; 分析师关注越多的企业社会责任承担水平越高; 分析师关注会削弱CEO薪酬与企业社会责任之间的正相关关系。同时,进一步研究发现,这种调节关系在CEO为男性群体以及CEO持股时具有显著性。

Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2017, the CEO compensation incentives and the analyst “monitoring” hypothesis, this paper conducts an empirical study of the impact of CEO compensation and analyst following on corporate social responsibility. It is found that the higher compensation that CEO receives, the higher level of social responsibility the corporate should take, and the more attention that the analyst following pollys to, the higher level of corporate social responsibility is expected. In most cases, the analyst following weakens the positive correlation between CEO compensation and corporate social responsibility. Meanwhile, the further research indicates that this regulatory effect is obvious when the CEO is a male group and the CEO is holding shares.